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Abstract 
The dominant depiction of undeclared work as exploitative low-paid employment has been 
contested by several locality studies which portray undeclared work to be mainly paid favours 
conducted voluntarily for close social relations to help them out. Reporting data from 28 
European countries to evaluate its wider validity, the finding is that most undeclared work is 
composed of paid favours and conducted voluntarily, especially in Western Europe and 
Nordic nations. The outcome is a call to shift away from seeking its eradication and for 
recognition that such work is predominantly a form of active citizenship that needs to be 
fostered.    
 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, work in the undeclared economy was conceptualised as 
exploitative low-paid employment conducted as a survival strategy and last resort by deprived 
populations excluded from the formal labour market (Castells and Portes, 1989; Sassen, 1997; 
Slavnic, 2010). The resultant policy approach was to seek to eradicate such work by 
increasing the penalties and risks of detection (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). In recent 
decades, however, in-depth locality studies of the nature of the undeclared economy and 
participants¶motives have begun to reveal that much undeclared work is conducted as paid 
favours for and by close social relations, such as kin, friends, neighbours and acquaintances, 
in order to help each other out (e.g., Larsen, 2013a,b; White, 2009, 2011; White and Williams, 
2010; Williams, 2004, 2009; Williams and Windebank, 2001). The resultant argument has 
been that undeclared work should not always be eradicated since to do so would be for 
government to eradicate precisely the active citizenship and mutual aid that it is otherwise 
seeking to nurture in community economies. The few studies so far undertaken nevertheless, 
have been relatively small-scale studies undertaken largely in communities in Western Europe 
in general and the UK more particularly. Whether such paid favours are more widely 
prevalent is therefore unknown.  
To fill this lacuna, the aim of this paper is to evaluate for the first time whether it is 
more widely the case that undeclared work is predominantly composed of paid favours and, if 
so, the implications for community economic development. The intention, therefore, is to seek 
answers to the following questions. What proportion of undeclared work in the 28 member 
states of the European Union (EU28) is conducted as paid favours for and by close social 
relations? Does this proportion vary across EU regions and member states? Who engages in 
this type of undeclared work? Why do they undertake undeclared paid favours? And what are 
the implications for tackling undeclared work and for community economic development?         
 To commence, therefore, section 2 briefly reviews the conventional conceptualisation 
of undeclared work as exploitative employment and the small number of studies that have led 
to the emergent recognition that undeclared work is sometimes predominantly composed of 
paid favours. Section 3 then presents the data used to evaluate whether this new depiction is 
more widely applicable, namely a 2013 Eurobarometer survey involving 27,563 face-to-face 
interviews on the nature of undeclared work across the 28 member states of the European 
Union (EU28). Section 4 reports the results. Revealing that undeclared work is commonly 
composed of paid favours, but that this is more the case in West European and Nordic 
communities, and less the case in Southern and East-Central European communities, the 
outcome in section 5 is a call for a recognition that undeclared work is mainly a form of active 
citizenship that needs to be harnessed, rather than eradicated, and for the adoption of a more 
geographically variegated conceptualisation of the overall nature and motives of undeclared 
work and its role in community economies across the EU28.     
 At the outset, however, undeclared work needs to be defined. Following the strong 
consensus, undeclared work here refers to paid work that is not declared to the authorities for 
tax, social security and/or labour law purposes when it should be (European Commission, 
2007; OECD, 2012; Williams, 2004, 2014a). If it is not legal in all other respects, it is not part 
of the undeclared economy. For instance, if the good and services traded are illegal (e.g., 
illegal drugs), then this is part of the wider criminal economy, and if unpaid, it is part of the 
unpaid informal economy. There are of course blurred edges to this definition, such as when 
in-kind labour or gifts are provided rather than money. Here, we consider only exchanges 
where money changes hands.  
 
Conceptualising undeclared work in community economies 
 
For many decades, undeclared work was widely assumed to be a form of exploitative low-
paid employment conducted by marginalised populations out of necessity as a survival 
strategy (e.g., Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Sassen, 1997). Jobs in the undeclared 
economy were thus viewed as existing at the bottom of a hierarchy of types of employment 
DNLQWR³GRZQJUDGHGODERXU´, with workers receiving low wages, few benefits, and with poor 
working conditions (Castells and Portes, 1989; Gallin, 2001). The consequent belief was that 
the undeclared economy had largely negative consequences for governments, workers, 
businesses and consumers. Governments lose tax revenue that could provide citizens with 
better social protection, health and educational services. Workers lose their entitlement to 
loans, pensions and social protection, while legitimate businesses witness unfair competition, 
and consumers lack any guarantees that health and safety regulations have been followed 
(Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 2014b). Based on this, the overarching belief was that the 
undeclared economy should be eradicated. The conventional means of achieving this has been 
to increase the costs of operating in the undeclared economy by either increasing the actual or 
perceived penalties for those caught, and/or by increasing the risks of detection (Allingham 
and Sandmo, 1972; Williams, 2014a). 
 Since the turn of the millennium, however, there has been an emergent recognition that 
there is a continuum of forms of undeclared work ranging from waged undeclared 
employment conducted by employees for a business at one end, to forms of undeclared self-
employment at the other (Williams, 2004). This recognition that undeclared work can be 
conducted on a self-employed basis has resulted in a more positive depiction of the 
undeclared economy as a hidden enterprise culture and test-bed where new business ventures 
can explore the viability of their venture before registering (Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 
2016). Rather than eradicate the undeclared economy, the argument was that if tax 
administrations eradicated it, they would stifle precisely the entrepreneurship and enterprise 
culture that other government ministries wished to nurture (Small Business Council, 2004). 
As such, calls were made to harness the activity in the undeclared economy by seeking to 
bring it into the declared realm (European Commission, 2007; ILO, 2015; OECD, 2012).   
 A small sub-set of literature, furthermore, has highlighted how such self-employment 
or own-account undeclared work covers a spectrum of activities ranging from profit-
motivated entrepreneurial endeavour, through social entrepreneurship, to smaller-scale, often 
one-off, paid favours conducted for close social relations such as a neighbour, friend or kin 
(Cornuel and Duriez, 1985; Jensen et al., 1996; Williams, 2004). In a study of incomers to 
new towns in France for example, Cornuel and Duriez (1985) find that participants often 
engaged in paid favours for their neighbours not for the purpose of making money but so as to 
develop their social networks in order to forge greater trust and the opportunity for 
reciprocity. Similarly, in a study in rural Pennsylvania, Jenson et al (1996) discover that many 
participating in undeclared work voiced reasons for doing so that had little or nothing to do 
with profit. By far the most extensive research on this issue, however, is in lower- and higher-
income urban and rural neighbourhoods in England (Williams, 2004, 2009; Williams and 
Windebank, 2001). Not only is it found that 70 per cent of all undeclared work is conducted 
by close social relations (i.e., friends, neighbours and kin) but economic gain hardly figured in 
their rationales. For example, a person may employ their cousin who is unemployed and in 
need of money to redecorate their living room in order to be able to give them some money so 
DV WR DYRLG DQ\ FRQQRWDWLRQ WKDW µFKDULW\¶ LV LQYROYHG ZKLFK ZRXOG UHVXOW LQ WKH FRXVLQ
refusing to accept the money. Similarly, a plumber or electrician may do some work for an 
HOGHUO\ SHUVRQ RU VRPHERG\ µKDUG XS¶ NQRZQ WR WKHP ZKR ZRXOG RWKHUZLVH EH XQDEOH WR
DIIRUG WRJHW VRPHQHFHVVDU\ UHSDLUZRUNGRQH DW JUHDWO\ UHGXFHG µPDWH¶V UDWHV¶ LQRUGHU WR
help them out. These redistributive and social network rationales are reinforced in a study of 
ZRPHQ¶V XQGHFODUHG ZRUN LQ 6DOIRUG LQ WKH 8. (Brill, 20010), and also a study of 134 
persons in the small city of Limninge in Sweden which came to a similar conclusion that most 
undeclared work is composed of paid favours for and by close social relations to help others 
out (Larsen, 2013b), such as when getting the car repaired (Larsen, 2013a). 
 The resultant argument has been that any attempt to deter or eradicate such paid 
favours will result in tax administrations eradicating precisely the active citizenship that other 
parts of government wish to nurture. Indeed, the finding is that paid favours are not only a 
significant proportion of all undeclared work but also that a large proportion of community 
exchange is now conducted on a monetised EDVLVDVµSDLGIDYRXUV¶:LOOLDPVDQG:LQGHEDQN
2001). Indeed, in the late 1990s English Localities Survey, over half of all community 
exchange in lower-income urban neighbourhoods was conducted as paid favours, meaning 
that to deter undeclared work would be to eradicate the majority of active citizenship in such 
neighbourhoods (Williams and Windebank, 2001). 
 There has also been a rethinking of the motivations underpinning undeclared work. 
When undeclared work was conceptualised as exploitative low-paid employment, the 
overwhelming view was that it was necessity-driven endeavour conducted as a last resort due 
WRWKHµH[FOXVLRQ¶RIGHSULYHGSRSXODWLRQVIURPWKHIRUPDOODERXUPDUNHW&DVWHOOVDQG3RUWHV
1989). However, with the recognition that a large proportion of all undeclared work is 
conducted by and for close social relations as paid favours for redistributive and community-
building purposes, a view has emerged that this is commonly undertaken as a voluntarily 
choice to help others out (Boels, 2014; Brill, 2010; Hodosi, 2015; Purdam and Tranmer, 2014; 
Ramas, 2016; Spandler et al., 2014; Williams, 2014a,b). 
 Until now, however, the few studies identifying that undeclared work is largely 
composed of paid favours have tended to be small-scale qualitative locality studies conducted 
largely in West European and Nordic nations. Whether undeclared work is more widely 
composed of paid favours, and thus whether a different approach is required towards such 
endeavour in community economic development, is currently unknown. The aim of this 
paper, therefore, is to evaluate for the first time whether paid favours is a widespread 
phenomenon and, if so, the implications for community economic development.   
 
Methodology 
 
To evaluate whether paid favours is a predominant form of undeclared work and the motives 
for engaging in such activity, along with who engages in such activity, we here report the 
results of special Eurobarometer survey no. 402, which involved 27,563 face-to-face 
interviews conducted in April and May 2013 across the 28 member states of the European 
Union (EU-28). Respondents were interviewed who were aged over 15 years old in their 
national language, with the number of interviews varying from 500 in smaller countries to 
1,500 in larger nations. A multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology was used 
to select respondents. This ensured that on the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, 
each country as well as each level of sample is representative in proportion to its population 
size. Therefore, for the univariate analysis we employed sample weighting, as recommended 
in both the wider literature (Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994) and the 
Eurobarometer methodology, to obtain meaningful descriptive results. For the multivariate 
analysis however, debate exists over whether a weighting scheme should be used 
(Pfeffermann, 1993; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994). Reflecting the dominant 
viewpoint, we decided not to use the weighting scheme. 
 The face-to-face interview schedule adopted a gradual approach to the more sensitive 
questions, firstly asking questions about the respondentV¶ DWWLWXGHV WRZDUGV the undeclared 
economy and having established a rapport, questions regarding their purchase of goods and 
services in the undeclared economy in the last 12 months along with their reasons for doing so 
and finally, questions regarding their engagement in undeclared work. Here, the focus is upon 
their responses as workers in undeclared economy for friends, relatives and neighbours. 
3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHILUVWDVNHGµ$SDUWIURPDUHJXODUHPSOR\PHQWKDYH\RX\RXUVHOIFDUULHGRXW
DQ\XQGHFODUHGSDLGDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHODVWPRQWKV"¶,IVRWKH\ZHUHDVNHGfor whom they 
carried out this activities (friends, relatives, neighbours, other private persons or households 
or for firms or businesses) and the reason for conducting these activities using the following 
question, µ:KDWZHUHWKHUHDVRQVIRUGRLQJWKHVHDFWLYLWLHVXQGHFODUHG"¶DPRQJWKHIROORZLQJ
the person(s) who acquired it insisted on the non-declaration; bureaucracy or red tape for a 
regular economic activity is too complicated; bureaucracy or red tape for minor or occasional 
activities is too complicated; you could not find a regular job; you were able to ask for a 
higher fee for your work; both parties benefited from it; taxes and\or social security 
contributions are too high; working undeclared is common practice in your region or sector of 
activity so there is no real alternative; the state does not do anything for you, so why should 
you pay taxes; it is difficult to live on social welfare benefits; you have no other means of 
income. 
To analyse first, who is more likely to provide paid favours to close social relations 
and second, the individual characteristics of those selecting different motives for explaining 
their engagement in paid favours, a logistic regression analysis provides a suitable technique. 
The following variables are analysed.  
 
Dependent variables: 
x Paid favours: a dichotomous variable with recorded value 1 for persons who answered 
³\HV´ WR WKHTXHVWLRQ³$SDUW IURPD UHJXODU HPSOR\PHQW KDYH \RX \RXUVHOI FDUULHGRXW
DQ\XQGHFODUHGSDLGDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHODVWPRQWKV"´for friends, relatives or neighbours 
and with recorded value 0 otherwise. 
x µVoluntary¶motives for doing paid favours: a dichotomous variable with recorded value 1 
IRU SHUVRQV ZKR UHSRUWHG DW OHDVW RQH ³H[LW´ PRWLYH IRU GRLQJ XQGHFODUHG ZRUN
(bureaucracy or red tape for a regular economic activity is too complicated; bureaucracy 
or red tape for minor or occasional activities is too complicated; you were able to ask for a 
higher fee for your work; both parties benefited from it; taxes and/or social security 
contributions are too high; the state does not do anything for you, so why should you pay 
WD[HVDQGQRQHRIWKHµH[FOXVLRQ¶PRWLYHVDQGZLWKUHFRUGHGYDOXHRWKHUZLVH 
x µNecessity-oriented¶ PRWLYHV IRU doing paid favours: a dichotomous variable with 
recorded value 1 for persons who reported at least RQH ³necessity-driven´ PRWLYH IRU
doing paid favours (the person(s) who acquired it insisted on the non-declaration; you 
could not find a regular job; working undeclared is common practice in your region or 
sector of activity so there is no real alternative; it is difficult to live on social welfare 
benefits; yRXKDYHQRRWKHUPHDQVRI LQFRPHDQGQRQHRI WKH µvoluntary¶PRWLYHV DQG
with recorded value 0 otherwise. 
x µ0L[HG¶PRWLYHVIRUdoing paid favours: a dichotomous variable with recorded value 1 for 
SHUVRQVZKRUHSRUWHGDWOHDVWRQH³necessity´PRWLYHDQGDWOHDVWRQH³voluntary´PRWLYH
for doing undeclared work, and with recorded value 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables: 
x Tax morality: constructed index of self-reported tolerance towards tax non-
compliance, where 1 represents higher tax morale and 10 lower tax morale.  
x Gender: a dummy variable with value 0 for females and 1 for males. 
x Age: a categorical variable indicating the age of a respondent with value 1 for 15 - 24 
years, value 2 for 25 - 39 years, value 3 for 40 - 54 years, and value 4 for 55 years and 
older. 
x Marital status: a categorical variable for the marital status of the respondent with 
value 1 for married/ remarried individuals, value 2 for single living with partners, 
value 3 for those single, and value 4 for those separated, divorced, widowed and for 
other form of marital status. 
x Occupation: a categorical variable grouping respondents by their occupation with 
value 1 for not working, value 2 for self-employed and value 3 for employed persons. 
x Difficulties paying bills: a categorical variable for the respondent difficulties in paying 
bills with value 1 for having difficulties most of the time, value 2 for occasionally, and 
value 3 for almost never/ never. 
x People 15+ years in own household: a categorical variable for people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 
2 for two persons, value 3 for three persons or more. 
x Children: a dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years old in the 
household with value 0 for individuals with no children and value 1 for those having 
children. 
x Area: a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with value 1 for 
rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 3 for large 
town. 
x Region: a categorical variable for the region where the respondent lives with value 1 
for East-Central Europe, value 2 for Western Europe, value 3 for Southern Europe, 
and value 4 for Nordic nations. 
We kept in the analysis the individuals for which data on each and every independent variable 
is available. 
 Before reporting the results, nevertheless, three issues need to be briefly highlighted. 
Firstly, some caution is urged when reading the results because it is well-established that there 
is both response bias and social desirability bias in responses to sensitive questions (Fisher, 
1993). Secondly, there is also a literature that surveys are unable to fully capture informal 
support between close social relations, not least because respondents do not remember such 
instances of community help (Spandler et al., 2014). Third and following on from the first two 
issues, there is a need for caution regarding the reliability of the data collected, especially 
given the sensitive subject matter involved. In 94 per cent of the interviews conducted, 
nevertheless, the interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation from the participant and 
in 5 percent of the cases the cooperation was average. Cooperation was asserted to be bad in 
less than 1 per cent of cases. Given this, attention can turn to an analysis of the results. 
 
Results 
 
Of the 27,563 face-to-face interviews conducted in the EU28, some 3% reported participating 
in undeclared work in the last 12 months. Of these, more than two-thirds (67.5%) reported 
that this undeclared work had been supplied as paid favours to friends, relatives or neighbours 
(see Table 1). Across the EU-28 as a whole, therefore, the majority (over two-thirds) of 
undeclared work is conducted for close social relations, suggesting the need for a 
reconceptualization of the undeclared economy. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, the proportion of undeclared work conducted for close social relations is not the 
same across all EU populations. Although 77.8% of undeclared work is for close social 
relations in Western Europe and 76.4% in Nordic nations, this falls to 63.3% in East-Central 
Europe and 47.2% in Southern Europe where undeclared work is more likely to be conducted 
as waged employment. This suggests, therefore, that undeclared work is more commonly paid 
favours in West European and Nordic nations. It is also the case that the undeclared work of 
men is more likely to be for close social relations (perhaps because women conduct such 
community exchange on an unpaid basis), as is the undeclared work of younger and older age 
groups compared with prime age workers, those living in rural areas, those in employment 
compared with the unemployed, and those who almost never have difficulties paying the 
household bills. This suggests, therefore, that doing paid favours is not largely the province of 
marginalised or vulnerable populations. 
 This is further reinforced when examining the motives for conducting paid favours for 
others. Across the EU28 as a whole, just 16% of those providing paid favours assert that they 
are driven out of necessity into doing such activities. Some 53% voluntarily choose to do so 
and the remaining 31% for a mixture of necessity-driven and voluntary rationales. However, 
although primarily a voluntary chosen endeavour, there are again variations across the EU 
regions. For example, the rationale of necessity was more common in Southern Europe in 
particular and also in East-Central Europe. Purely voluntary rationales, meanwhile, were 
particularly prevalent in Nordic nations but also in West European countries.  
   
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
To evaluate whether these descriptive findings about the likelihood of undeclared work being 
conducted as paid favours, and the reasons for doing paid favours, are statistically significant 
when other variables are introduced and held constant, Table 3 reports the results of a logistic 
regression analysis. Examining the likelihood of undeclared work being conducted as paid 
favours for close social relations for different groups, the finding is that those who hold a 
higher tax morality and those living in Western Europe compared with those living in East-
Central Europe are significantly more likely to do so. Meanwhile, those living in Southern 
Europe are significantly less likely than those in East-Central Europe to engage in a favour for 
a friend, relative or neighbour when they conduct undeclared work.   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Examining the populations more likely to state that they do paid favours as a matter of choice 
rather than out of necessity, the finding is that the employed are significantly more likely than 
the unemployed to do so, as are those who never or almost never have difficulties in paying 
bills and those living in Nordic nations.  
 Analysing the populations more likely to state that their conduct of paid favours for 
close social relations is necessity-driven, meanwhile, the finding is that the employed persons 
and those living in urban areas are significantly less likely to cite purely necessity-driven 
rationales, as are those living in Nordic nations significantly less likely to carry out paid 
favours as a necessity-driven endeavour, whilst those living in Southern Europe are more 
likely to cite necessity rationales. 
 The individuals carrying out paid favours due to a combination of rationales, 
meanwhile, reveals that employed persons, those never or almost never facing difficulties in 
paying bills and those living in Southern Europe significantly less likely to cite mixed 
reasons. Those aged between 25 and 35 years are more likely to cite these mixed reasons 
compared with those aged between 15 and 25 years old. 
     
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This paper has revealed that over two-thirds (67.8%) of all undeclared work conducted in the 
EU28 is undertaken for close social relations (e.g., kin, neighbours, friends, acquaintances), 
although a greater proportion of undeclared work is paid favours in Nordic nations (76.4% of 
all reported undeclared work) and Western Europe (77.8%) than in East-Central Europe 
(63.3%) and Southern Europe (47.2%). When examining their motives for doing so, 
PRUHRYHU WKHUH DSSHDUV WR H[LVW ZKDW FDQ EH YLHZHG DV DQ ³XSSHU WLHU´ of participants 
engaging in such community endeavour as a matter of choice, which is significantly more 
likely to be populated by the employed, those with few financial difficulties and living in 
Nordic nations DQG D ³ORZHU WLHU´ RI QHFHVVLW\-driven participants doing so as a coping 
strategy, significantly more likely to be populated by the unemployed and those living in 
Southern Europe,QWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDVDZKROHWKHQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH³XSSHU
WLHU´LVPRUHWKDQWULSOHWKHQXPEHULQWKH³lower-WLHU´However, this ratio significantly varies 
across European regions. Southern Europe has a 1.3:1 ratio of those purely necessity-driven 
compared with those doing so more as a matter of choice. Conversely, Nordic nations and 
Western Europe have a 15:1 ratio and 5.8:1 ratio respectively between those doing so out of 
choice and those who are necessity-driven.  
 The theoretical implication therefore, is that undeclared work in the EU28 needs to be 
reconceptualised as predominantly involving paid favours between close social relations, 
although the degree to which it predominates varies regionally, with paid favours far more 
predominant in Western Europe and the Nordic nations than in East-Central and Southern 
Europe. The longstanding view that this work contributes little to community economies and 
has largely negative consequences for citizens, workers, consumers, businesses and 
governments thus needs to be questioned. The recognition that it is largely conducted for 
close social relations, and usually out of choice such as to help somebody out, suggests that 
much of this is a form of active citizenship. In other words, it is community exchange, which 
refers to the provision of material help on a one-to-one basis within the extended family and 
social or neighbourhood networks (Williams and Windebank, 2000). Although the recurring 
assumption has been that community exchanges do not involve monetary payment (e.g., 
Komter, 1996; Leonard, 1994; Pahl, 1984; Renooy, 1990) and that making monetary 
payments shifts such community exchange from the non-market sphere of reciprocity into the 
profit-motivated market realm, this is not always the case. The result is that the formalist 
DQWKURSRORJ\ DSSURDFK DQG HFRQRPLVWLF GLVFRXUVHV WKDW DGRSW D µWKLQ¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
monetary exchange need replacing by D µVXEVWDQWLYLVW¶ DQWKURSRORJLFDO SRVLWLRQ DQG
LQVWLWXWLRQDOHFRQRPLFVDSSURDFKWKDWDGRSWVDµWKLFNHU¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPRQHWDry exchange 
in which transactions are viewed in terms of social norms and values and as being socially, 
culturally and geographically embedded (Bourdieu, 2001; Comelieau, 2002; Lee, 2000; Slater 
and Tonkiss, 2001; Zelizer, 1994). 
 What is now required is to build on this µthicker¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPRQHWDU\H[FKDQJH
and to identify why community help has been monetized in some countries. Future research, 
therefore, could usefully examine the associations between cross-national variations in the 
prevalence of paid favours and various country-level economic and social conditions. Is it the 
case, for example, that this is purely a product of economic development, and thus 
significantly associated with the level of GDP per capita? Or is it the case that other social and 
welfare conditions are also determinants? For example, are paid favours significantly 
associated with some types of welfare regime (e.g., commodified Liberal welfare regimes) 
and not others (e.g. Southern European family-oriented varieties), with low levels of social 
expenditure, the demise of voluntarism, higher levels of commodification, and so forth? 
Mapping the association between institutional arrangements and the prevalence of paid 
favours cross-nationally will enable tentative explanations to start to be developed. It is not 
just re-theorising undeclared work as predominantly involving paid favours, and explaining 
the institutional arrangements which lead to its prevalence, that is important. So too are the 
policy consequences. 
 Given that undeclared work is mostly composed of paid favours, the policy 
implication is that the conventional approach of seeking its eradication should no longer be 
pursued. This would eradicate precisely the active citizenship that governments wish to foster. 
Instead, two options are available. Firstly, a laissez-faire approach could be adopted, which 
would entail that the government would refrain from interfering in this type of undeclared 
work. However, if adopted, state actors would find it subsequently difficult to differentiate 
between undeclared work conducted for purely profit-motivated rationales, which they would 
wish to actively tackle, and paid favours conducted for reasons akin to mutual aid, which they 
would wish to do nothing about. Although businesses working undeclared are easily 
categorised, it would become more difficult when examining individuals conducting 
undeclared work on an autonomous basis. Whether they are the self-employed doing so for 
financial gain or individuals engaged in mutual aid to help others would be difficult to 
decipher. For this reason alone, adopting a laissez-faire or do nothing approach is 
inappropriate.  
Secondly, therefore, and rather than eradicate it, government might choose to facilitate 
its formalisation. This could be achieved by either developing mechanisms through which 
such work can be conducted in a legitimate manner, or changing the rules so as to make this 
activity no longer illegal. The former could include initiatives such as Local Exchange and 
Trading Schemes (LETS) or time banks which siphon off activity from the realm of 
illegitimate undeclared work into a sphere of legitimate mutual aid. These local bodies 
publish a list of tasks that citizens need doing, and a list of tasks that citizens wish to 
undertake for others, for which they are then paid in a local currency or one hour of time. 
They have not only been implemented in many countries but also shown to act as an effective 
substitute for acquiring goods and services in the undeclared economy (Williams, 1996; 
Williams et al., 2001a,b). The latter issue of changing the rules so as to make this activity no 
longer illegal, meanwhile, might simply entail a change to the law in order to allow citizens to 
earn a fixed amount each year tax free from own account work. In the UK, for example, the 
LQLWLDWLYH WR DOORZ FLWL]HQV WR HDUQ XS WR  SHU DQQXP LQ WKH µVKDULQJ HFRQRP\¶ IURP
2017 could be easily extended to include earnings from paid favours (see Davidson, 2016).   
In sum, this paper has sought to transcend the negative depiction of undeclared work 
as exploitative low-paid waged employment that needs to be eradicated. Instead, it has shown 
that in the EU28, a view has emerged of undeclared work as predominantly composed of paid 
favours conducted for close social relations to help them out. If this paper thus stimulates a 
shift towards reconceptualising undeclared work as often predominantly a form of active 
citizenship that needs to be harnessed rather than eradicated, then one of its intentions will 
have been achieved. If this then stimulates further research to evaluate whether this is also the 
case elsewhere in the world, then its fuller intention will have been attained. What is certain, 
however, is that undeclared work can no longer be negatively viewed as always harmful to 
community economies and universally in need of eradication. 
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Table 1. Participation in undeclared paid favours in the past 12 months, by EU region and 
socio-demographic characteristics (N=1,048) 
 Number of 
respondents 
conducting 
undeclared 
work 
% of 
undeclared 
work that is 
conducted for 
close social 
relations 
All EU28 1,048 67.5 
 East-Central Europe  63.3 
Western Europe  77.8 
Southern Europe  47.2 
Nordic nations  76.4 
Tax morality  Above mean  65.6 
Below mean  70.0 
Gender Men  71.5 
Women  61.2 
Age 15 - 24 years  70.7 
25 - 39 years  64.1 
40 - 54 years  65.6 
55 years and older  73.5 
Marital status Married/ remarried  65.1 
Single living with partners  65 
Single  67.3 
Divorced/ Separated/ Widowed/ 
Other 
 77.5 
Occupation Not working  65.8 
Self-employed  67.2 
Employed  69.9 
Difficulties paying 
bills 
Most of the time  63.3 
From time to time  58.5 
Almost never/ never  77.2 
People 15+ years in 
own household 
One person  68.9 
Two persons  70.1 
Three persons or more  63.5 
Children Yes  67.9 
No  66.8 
Area Rural area or village  69.2 
Small or middle sized town  68.0 
Large town  64.5 
Note: We kept in the analysis the individuals for which data on each and every independent variable is 
available. 
 
Table 2. Reasons for engaging in undeclared paid favours in the European Union, by region 
(N=722) 
Region Number of 
respondents 
Motives (%) 
Necessity Voluntary Mixed 
EU28 722 16 53 31 
East-Central Europe Xx 17 47 36 
Western Europe Xx 10 58 32 
Southern Europe Xx 42 32 26 
Nordic nations xx 5 76 19 
Note: We kept in the analysis the individuals for which data on each and every independent variable is 
available. 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Logistic regression of the odds of, and reasons for, conducting undeclared paid 
favours in the European Union 
 Paid favours Reasons 
Necessity Voluntary Mixed 
Tax morality (i.e., 
acceptability of 
undeclared work) 
-0.0662** (0.0300) -0.0116 (0.0802) 0.0327 (0.0528) -0.0255 (0.0396) 
Gender (Female)     
Male 0.291* (0.169) -0.0924 (0.206) 0.150 (0.204) -0.105 (0.169) 
Age (15-24)     
25-39 0.0135 (0.250) -0.607* (0.336) -0.401 (0.276) 0.705*** (0.227) 
40-54 -0.156 (0.267) 0.230 (0.377) -0.404 (0.320) 0.288 (0.276) 
55+ 0.255 (0.321) 0.312 (0.397) 0.0451 (0.411) -0.219 (0.397) 
Marital status ([Re-]Married)    
Single with partner -0.0314 (0.215) 0.123 (0.549) -0.517** (0.238) 0.486 (0.303) 
Single 0.225 (0.229) 0.310 (0.380) -0.293 (0.279) 0.191 (0.253) 
Divorced/ Separated/ 
Widowed/ Other 
0.333* (0.174) 0.00788 (0.386) -0.107 (0.304) 0.141 (0.263) 
Occupation (Not working)    
Self-employed 0.0656 (0.256) -0.774 (0.515) 0.331 (0.242) 0.152 (0.236) 
Employed -0.0380 (0.139) -0.821** (0.405) 1.132*** (0.223) -0.778*** (0.166) 
Difficulties paying bills (Most of the time)    
From time to time 0.0326 (0.202) -0.303 (0.246) 0.694*** (0.267) -0.444* (0.262) 
Almost never/ never 0.259 (0.170) -0.498 (0.323) 1.487*** (0.277) -1.264*** (0.274) 
People 15+ years in own household (One)    
Two 0.318 (0.237) -0.295 (0.279) 0.161 (0.265) 0.00521 (0.252) 
Three or more 0.198 (0.201) -0.283 (0.334) -0.0275 (0.322) 0.201 (0.289) 
Children (No children)    
Having children 0.179 (0.174) 0.310 (0.346) 0.199 (0.218) -0.400 (0.247) 
Area (Rural area or village)    
Small or middle sized 
town 
-0.140 (0.227) -0.689*** (0.262) 0.269 (0.230) 0.148 (0.240) 
Large town -0.171 (0.211) -0.824*** (0.281) 0.454* (0.260) 0.0157 (0.269) 
Region (E-C Europe)     
Western Europe 0.487*** (0.172) -0.241 (0.373) -0.156 (0.274) 0.318 (0.274) 
Southern Europe -0.754*** (0.193) 1.099*** (0.329) -0.0141 (0.315) -0.976*** (0.309) 
Nordic nations 0.317 (0.302) -1.762** (0.783) 0.716*** (0.211) -0.124 (0.201) 
Constant 0.429 (0.499) -0.411 (0.608) -1.383** (0.569) -0.181 (0.499) 
N 1,048 722 722 722 
Pseudo R2 0.0428 0.1247 0.1363 0.0904 
Log pseudolikelihood -621.87133 -268.20738 -430.07579 -405.25101 
Ȥ2 338.83 769.99 513.10 338.95 
p> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
We kept in the analysis the individuals for which data on each and every independent variable is available. 
 
  
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Variables used in the analysis: definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition 
Mode or mean Min/ 
Max N = 1,048 N = 722 
Dependent variables     
Paid favours      Dummy variable of undeclared paid favours 
carry out in the last 12 months, apart from a 
regular employment 
Making undeclared 
paid favours (67.5%) 
- 0 / 1 
Voluntary            'XPP\YDULDEOHRI³voluntary´PRWLYH
which led to undeclared paid favours 
- ³Voluntary´
motive mentioned 
(53%) 
0 / 1 
Necessity                          'XPP\YDULDEOHRI³necessity´PRWLYH
which led to undeclared paid favours 
- ³Necessity´PRWLYH
not mentioned 
(84%) 
0 / 1 
Mixed               'XPP\YDULDEOHRI³PL[HG´PRWLYHVZKLFK
led to undeclared paid favours 
- ³0L[HG´PRWLYHV 
not mentioned 
(69%) 
0 / 1 
Independent 
variables 
    
Tax morality Constructed index of self-reported tolerance 
towards tax non-compliance 
3.6 3.6 1 / 10 
Gender Dummy for the gender of the respondent Male (61%) Male (65%) 0 / 1 
Age  Respondent age in categories 25-39 years (34%) 25-39 years (32%) 1 / 4 
Marital status Respondent marital status in categories Single (34%) Single (34%) 1 / 4 
Occupation Respondent occupation in categories Not working (51%) Not working (50%) 1 / 3 
Difficulties paying 
bills 
Respondent difficulties in paying bills in 
categories 
Almost never/ never 
(41%) 
Almost never/ 
never (47%) 
1 / 3 
People 15+ years in 
own household 
People 15+ years in respondent`s household 
(including the respondent) in categories 
Three or more (38%) Two (38%) 1 / 3 
Children Dummy for the presence of children (up to 
14 years old) in the household 
No children (67%) No children (67%) 0 / 1 
Area Size of the area where the respondent lives 
in categories 
Small or middle sized 
town (39%) 
Small or middle 
sized town (40%) 
1 / 3 
Region Region where the respondent lives in 
categories 
Western Europe 
(46%) 
Western Europe 
(53%) 
1 / 4 
 
 
